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In Flast v. Cohen,' the Supreme Court held that under certain cir-
cumstances federal taxpayers have standing consistent with Article
III to challenge the constitutionality of congressional spending pro-
grams.2 However, standing is only one of several federal jurisdic-
tional requirements. Under both the federal question and diversity4
jurisdiction of the district courts there is an amount in controversy
requirement of $10,000. If the jurisdictional amount is not met, even
plaintiffs with unquestioned standing cannot proceed in federal court.
Kenneth Davis has said of Flast that "the narrow holding seems
impregnable and seems destined to become a long-term cornerstone
of the law of standing."5 However, a recent case concerning aggregation
of claims to meet jurisdictional amount, Snyder v. Harris,' vitiates the
practical effect of the seemingly monumental Flast decision. If Flast
is to be more than an illusion, Snyder must be circumvented, either
legislatively or judicially.
I. Jurisdictional Amount, Aggregation and Class Actions.
In determining amount in controversy,7 judges must first decide
the "viewpoint" from which the matter is to be valued. The great ma-
1. 592 U.S. 83 (1968).
2. The Court held that
[A] taxpayer will have standing consistent with Article 1II to invoke federal judicial
power when he alleges that congressional action under the taxing and spending
lause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which operate to restrict
the exercise of the taxing and spending power.
392 U.S. at 105-06.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1964).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
5. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. Cm. L. REv. 601 (1968).
6. 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
7. The amount in controversy requirement in general, and the aggregation problem
in particular, have elicited much comment. See, e.g., Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount
in the United States District Court, 38 H,V. L. Rnv. 733 (1925); BIlume, jurisdictional
Amount in Representative Suits, 15 MINN. L. REv. 501 (1931); Note, 80 U. PA. L RM'.
106 (1931); Shulman & Jaegerman, Some Jurisdictional Limitations in Federal Pro-
cedure, 45 YAr.E L.J. 393 (1936); Comment, 25 CauF. L. REv. 336 (1937); Note, Federal
Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 CoLuze. L. REv. 818 (1946); Itsen &
Sardell, The Monetary Minimum in Federal Court Jurisdiction, 1, 29 St. Join's L. REV. 1
(1954); Id., 1I, 29 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 183 (1955); Comment, Amount in Controversy in
Suits for Nonmonetary Remedies, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1958); Note, Federal Jurisdic-
tional Amount: Determination of the Matter in Controversy, 73 Hnv. L. REV. 1369 (1960);
Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39 (1957);
Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 68 CoLum. L REv. 1554 (1968); Wright.
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jority of federal courts, adopting the "plaintiff-viewpoint," 8 hold that
the matter in controversy is the "value of the right" asserted to the
plaintiff.9 The minority test, termed the "defendant-viewpoint," is that
the matter in controversy is the "value of the right" asserted to either
the plaintiff or defendant, whichever amount is greater.1" In many
suits, a choice between viewpoints is not necessary, since the amounts
are usually equal. But in some situations, as when a plaintiff with
$9,000 in damages seeks to enjoin a $100,000 business as a nuisance,
the choice of viewpoint will determine the existence of federal juris.
diction.:1
When there are multiple parties to a lawsuit, a second amount in
controversy issue arises-whether aggregation of interests is to be al.
lowed. When there is more than one plaintiff, the issue is governed
by rules derived from the common law of joinder. 2 In 1832, the Su-
preme Court held that joined plaintiffs could not aggregate "separate
and distinct" claims in order to meet amount in controversy require-
ments. 13 The rationale was that when parties, for their own convenience,
joined to prosecute claims that could have been adjudicated indi-
vidually,14 federal courts would be unduly expanding their jurisdiction
if they entertained jointly claims which they could not hear separately.
Aggregation was permitted only when the right involved was "un-
divided" or "common" to all joined plaintiffs.18 In such situations,
since the interests of one plaintiff could not be adjudicated without
determining the rights of others,' 6 the matter in controversy was clearly
the combined interests of all plaintiffs and aggregation was permitted."
Class Actions, 47 FR.D. 169 (1969); Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Glaims for
Achievement of Jurisdictional Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 601 (1969); Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part lI, 36 U. CI. L. REV. 268, 296.
98 (1969); Annotations, 30 A.L.R.2d 602, 2 A.L.R. Fed. 18, 3 A.L.R. Fed. 372.
See generally 2 W. BARRON & A. HoLoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDtI= § 569
(Wright ed., 1961, 1969 Supp.) [hereinafter cited as BARRON & HoLTzoFF]; 1 J. MlooRI!,
FEDERAL PRACricE 0.90-0.99. [hereinafter cited as MooRE]: C. WRIGHT, 1;EDEAL COtiwr1a
§ 86 (1963).
8. See 1 MOORE 0.91 [1] at 827 and cases cited at n.6 therein.
9. See Dobie, supra note 7.
10. See 1 MOORE 0.91 [1]; C. WRIGHT, supra note 7 § 34 at 100 and cases cited therein.
11. Of course, even after the viewpoint is chosen, problems may remain in precisely
"valuing the right" asserted in a particular suit. See, e.g., McNutt v. General Motors
Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178 (1936).
12. See Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 68 CoLUtI. L. REV. 1554, 1555.57
(1968).
13. Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832).
14. This was "permissive joinder."
15. For some of the problems in deciding when claims are common and undivided
and when they are separate and distinct, see Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions,
supra note 12, at 1558-62.
16. This was "compulsory joinder."
17. See Note, supra note 12, at 1556.
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These aggregation rules were carried over from the joinder cases and
applied by the courts to class actions brought under Rule 23 of the
1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23 allowed one or more
of a group of persons interested in a matter to sue or be sued as repre-
sentatives of the others. Under the Rule, three types of class actions
could be brought. The three categories, which were based on the
nature of the rights asserted by the plaintiffs,' 8 were designed both to
define the situations amenable to class suits and to determine the
effective scope of judgments in Rule 23 actions.'9 In the first category,
"true" class actions, the rights involved were common and undivided.
In the second and third categories, "hybrid" and "spurious" class ac-
tions, the rights involved were separate and distinct. Using the joinder
cases as precedent, the courts ruled that aggregation was permitted
only in true class suits, since in that category alone were the claims
common and undivided.20 Often, the courts omitted all reference to
the old joinder classifications and instead used the terms true, hybrid,
and spurious as the guiding terminology when deciding the aggregation
issue in class actions.2' Thus, the rules governing aggregation and Rule
23 categorization became entwined.
Application of Rule 23 categories to aggregation problems entailed
implicit adoption of the "plaintiff-viewpoint" approach to jurisdictional
amount, since the Rule focused on the nature of the rights and interests
asserted by plaintiffs. That very focus, however, caused widespread
dissatisfaction with Rule 23. The application of terms such as "com-
mon," "undivided," and "several" to rights in particular fact situations
18. Rule 23, as originally promulgated, provided in relevant part
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as to make it
practicable to bring them all before the court, such of them, one or more, as
will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may, on behalf of all, sue or
be sued, when the character of the right sought to be enforced for or against the
class is
(1) joint or common, or secondary in the sense that the ov.mer of a primary right
refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class thereby becomes entitled to
enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or
may affect specific property involved in the action; or(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several
rights and a common relief is sought.
19. See Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 93 (1956).
See generally, Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the
Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. LJ. 551, 570-76 (1937).
20. See, e.g., Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66 (1939); Buck v. Gallagher, 307 US. 95 (1939).
See generally 5B MooRE 23.13; 2 BARsuoN & HOLrZoFF § 569.
21. See Neville v. Delta Ins. Co., 45 F.R.D. 345, 347 (D. Minn. 1963).
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often led to confusion, since the common law rule and rationale which
underlay the terms were neither self-executing nor self-explanatory. As
a result, both courts and commentators faced recurring problems in
categorizing Rule 23 suits as true, hybrid, or spurious.22
In an attempt to end the confusion, Rule 23 was amended in 1966.23
The amended rule categorizes cases that are appropriate for class
treatment "functionally" rather than "conceptually."24 There is no
reference to true, hybrid, or spurious actions, or to the nature of tile
rights asserted by the plaintiffs. The availability of the class action
device is determined by situational factors such as the size of the class,
the representativeness of the parties, the presence of common ques-
tions of law and fact, and the risks of denying class action status.25
22. See, e.g., Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp, 27 F. Supp. 763 (ED, Pa.), rctd
108 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1939), rev'd 311 U.S. 282 (1940), on remand 39F. Supp. 592 (EIDl 11a,),
rev'd sub. nom. Penns. Co. for Insurance on Lives v. Deckert, 123 F.2d 979 (3d CIr. 1941).
The case was variously characterized as a "class bill," 27 F. Supp. at 769, as "spurious,"
108 F.2d at 55, and as "hybrid," 39 F. Supp. at 595. Finally, the Third Circuit said that
"names are not important." 123 F.2d at 983.
For a description of the wanderings of the Deckert case, see Z. CHAFEE, SO=M PRODLEtS
OF EQurrY 263-89 (1950).
23. See Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98-99 (1966);
Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 177 (1969).
24. The language is Professor Wright's. Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.RD. 169, 170, 177
(1969).
25. Rule 23 now provides, in relevant part:
(a) Prerequisites To Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or be
sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action If
the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of se arate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk op
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudication with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing
the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or cor-
responding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) tI
interest of members of the class in individually controllinU the prosecution or defense
of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the con.
troversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability
or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
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II. The Snyder Holding: "Workable Standards."
The actions in Snyder v. Harris arose in the context of the 1966
amendment to Rule 23.216 The plaintiffs contended that the new Rule
23, by abolishing the old class action categories with their narrow focus
on the "common" or "several" nature of the plaintiffs' claims, also
abolished the old aggregation principle for class actions, which had
the same focus and which, through judicial decision, had made the
abolished categorization determinative. They argued that the amended
rule authorized aggregation of claims in every suit maintainable as a
class action. In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court rejected that posi-
tion.27
Justice Black's majority opinion held that "[tihe doctrine that sep-
arate and distinct claims could not be aggregated was never, and is
not now, based on the categories of old Rule 23 or any rule of proce-
dure.12 8 Rather, the Court viewed the doctrine as based upon judicial
construction, predating the 1938 Rules, of the language of the diversity
jurisdiction statute.29 Under that statute, jurisdiction exists only when
the "matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, ex-
clusive of interests and costs." 0 Since an amendment to Rule 23 could
26. The decision actually involved two cases. The first, Snyder v. Harris, arose out of
an action by a shareholder, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, against
members of a company's board of directors. She accused the named directors of selling
their stock for amounts greatly in excess of its fair market value. Mrs. Snyder claimed
that the excess represented a control premium, which should be distributed to the stock-
holders under Missouri law. The District Court, finding that Mrs. Snyder's claim vas
only $8,740, dismissed the action for want of jurisdictional amount, refusing to let the
claims of all stockholders constitute the amount in controversy. 268 F. Supp. 701 (ED.
Mo. 1967). If all the claims were aggregated, the amount in controversy would have been
approximately $1,200,000. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. 390 F.2d 204 (8th
Cir. 1968).
In the companion case, Gas Service Company v. Coburn, a customer sued on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated to recover alleged overpayments made to a
gas company. Coburn's claim was only $7.81, but the aggregated claims of the class exceeded
$10,000. 394 U.S. at 334. The gas company moved to dismiss for failure to satisfy the
jurisdictional amount. The motion was denied, and the denial was affirmed on appeal.
389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968).
27. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Snyder to resolve the conflict among the
Circuits on the issue of aggregating claims in class suits. In Alvarez v. Pan. Am. Life Ins.
Co., 375 F.2d 992 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 US. 827 (1967), the Fifth Circuit had denied
aggregation in a class suit.
Several District Courts had faced similar problems. Compare Booth v. General Dynamics
Corp., 264 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. M. 1967); Collins v. Bolton, 287 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. IlM. 1968);
and, Snyder v. Epstein, 290 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Wise. 1968), all permitting aggregation,
with Lesch v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R. Co. 279 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Ill. 1968); and, Pomierski
v. W.R. Grace & Co, 282 F. Supp. 385 (N.D. IMI. 1967), denying aggregation.
28. 394 US. at 336.
29. Id. The fact that the "joint"-'separate" distinction predated the 1938 rules is
hardly open to question. See, e.g., Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1964).
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not modify the diversity statute, Black concluded, it could not affect the
settled aggregation doctrine.81
The majority recognized that its decision would force lower courts
to continue to decide whether class suits involved "joint and common"
or "separate and distinct" claims, but it stated that
lower courts have developed largely workable standards for deter-
mining when claims are joint and common, and therefore entitled
to be aggregated, and when they are separate and distinct, and
therefore not aggregable.3 2
Moreover, Black continued, there are a number of federal jurisdic-
tional grants that do not entail amount in controversy requirements."'
Unless a class suit involves traditionally aggregable claims or can be
brought under these other statutes, he implied, it is probably best
brought in state courts.
In a vigorous dissent, Justice Fortas maintained that the Court's
decision was unfaithful to the spirit of the 1966 Amendment. Fortas
reasoned that although the amount in controversy requirement was
statutory, aggregation rules were court made and could be judicially
modified. He criticized the majority for preserving standards that
had been widely criticized as impractical and arbitrary8 4 Moreover,
Fortas warned, the majority's decision would affect class suits brought
under the federal question jurisdictional statute, which contains "mat-
ter in controversy" language identical to that in the diversity statute
involved in Snyder. Indeed, that conclusion is inescapable, since federal
courts have always applied the same aggregation rule to federal ques-
tion class suits as they have to those based on diversity jurisdiction06
31. 394 U.S. at 337-40.
32. 394 U.S. at 341 (emphasis added).
33. Id. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (civil rights); 28 US.C. § 1346 (United States as
defendant). For the difficulties inherent in relying solely on such provisions, see Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939), and note 60 infra.
34. 394 U.S. at 352. For a strong criticism of the old Rule 23 categories see Note, Fed-
eral Class Actions: A Suggested Revision of Rule 23, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 818, 823-24, n,6
(1946):
Analyzed in terms of claims, the cases yield a curious pattern of inconsistency ....
"Undivided interest," "single right," and other verbalisns are also employed. Like
the shapeless pattern of the cases, they are based upon no rational principles or
ascertainable policy considerations.
See also, Kalven & Rosenfeld, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 CIII. L.
REV. 684, 707, n.73 (1941) ("accursed labels'); Z. CnAFFEE, SomE. PnOabMs oy Eguotr
245-46 (1950) ("outworn categories'); Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Commltea:
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REy. .456, 381
(1967).
35. See, e.g., Scott v. Frazier, 253 US. 243 (1920), p. 1584 infra.
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III. Implications for Flast.
Flast was instituted in federal district court pursuant to the general
federal question statute.38 It was clearly a class suit.e7 However, neither
Florence Flast, Albert Shanker, nor any of the other complainants
could claim that their tax bill had been increased $10,000 by the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. s If the jurisdic-
tional amount was to be met, therefore, aggregation would have to
be allowed. The issue, then, is whether, under the "workable stan-
dards" developed in taxpayer suits, Flast is the kind of suit in which
the claims of the plaintiffs are aggregable. The Flast Court, however,
did not confront the issue.39
Prior to Snyder, lower federal courts, and the Supreme Court it-
self, held in a long line of decisions40 that taxpayer suits involve
"separate and distinct" claims, which cannot be aggregated to meet
federal amount in controversy requirements.- The practical effect of
36. Brief for Appellants before United States Supreme Court, Appendix at 5a. The
original suit was entitled Flast v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The plaintiffs
were New York residents and federal taxpayers. They sought to challenge the constitu-
tionality of those portions of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 that
provided for aid to parochial schools.
37. According to the first paragraph of the complaint, the suit was brought by the
taxpayers "on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated." Id. at Sa.
In the brief, appellants argued that the challenged disbursements "will surely have a
substantial effect on the aggregate bill of all the taxpayers in whose behalf this class
action has been brought." Brief for Appellants, at 28.
However, the record contains no evidence that a court, pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1), deter-
mined "by order" that the class action device was appropriate. See Davis, -upra note 5,
at 613. Presumably, this oversight can be attributed to the preliminary confusion over
standing.
38. Professor Davis estimated that a New York taxpayer who paid $1000 in federal
income tax "spent" about twelve cents on the challenged programs. Id. at 611.
39. One commentator attributes this omission to the "excitement" over standing. Currie,
The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute (Part II), 36 U. Cmr. L. RE%'. 263, 299
n.379 (1969).
Neither the complaint, the answer, nor the briefs in Flast confronted the aggrega-
tion problem. Although FEn. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) allows courts to raise jurisdictional issues
sua sponte, that was never done in Flast.
40. Russell v. Stansell, 105 U.S. 303 (1881); El Paso Water Co. v. City of El Paso, 152
US. 157 (1894); Colvin v. City of Jacksonville, 158 US. 456 (1895); Ogden N. Armstrong.
168 U.S. 224 (1897); Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379 (1901); Rogers v. Hennepin County,
239 U.S. 621 (1916); Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920); State of Ohio ex rel. Erkenbrecher
v. Cox, 257 F. 334 (S.D. Ohio 1919); Dewar v. Brooks, 16 F. Supp. 636 (D. Nev. 1936);
Guerra v. City of Philadelphia, 36 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Pa. 1940); Stevenson v. City of
Bluefield, 39 F. Supp. 462 (D. W. Va. 1941); Doby v. Brown, 135 F. Supp. 584 (D. N.C.
1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1956); Vraney v. County of Pinellas, 250 F.2d 617 (5ti
Cir. 1958); Fuller v. Volk, 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965).
See generally 2 BARoRN & HOLTZOFF § 569; 3B MOORE t 23.13.
41. One early Supreme Court case, Brown v. Trousdale, 138 U.S. 389 (1591), allowed
a state taxpayer to compute the total loss to all taxpayers for the purpose of establishing
the amount in controversy. Colvin v. City of Jacksonville, 158 U.S. 456 (1895), attempted
feebly to distinguish Brown, but since both cases involved diversity taxpayers' attempts to en.
join local bond issues, they appear indistinguishable. All subsequent cases in the Supreme
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these decisions, which require that the jurisdictional amount be met by
each complainant, has been to keep taxpayer suits out of the original
jurisdiction of the federal courts.42
Particularly relevant is the Supreme Court's opinion in Scott v.
Frazier.4 In that case, a group of North Dakota taxpayers sued, on
behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, to enjoin the
expenditure of state funds in implementation of a series of controver-
sial statutes.44 Alleging that the expenditures violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's ban on spending public money for a private purpose,
the plaintiffs attempted to proceed under general federal question
jurisdiction.4" In a short opinion, the Court noted that "there is no alle-
gation that the loss or injury to any complainant amounts to the sum
of $3,000. It is well settled that in such cases as this the amount in con-
troversy must exceed the jurisdictional sum as to each complainant."4
Consequently, the case was remanded to the District Court to be dis-
missed for want of jurisdiction.
Scott was held to be controlling over forty-five years later in Fuller v.
Volk.47 The plaintiffs in Fuller were New Jersey taxpayers who sought
to enjoin the expenditure of state funds in support of school desegrega-
tion plans. The Third Circuit, defining the issue as "whether a tax-
payer's suit is one in which the claims of the class may be aggregated," 48
Court have ignored the Brown holding. See note 40 supra.
Professor Moore has suggested that Brown stands for the proposition that aggregation
is permissible where the plaintiff asserts a "public right" rather than a "personal right."
3B MOORE 23.12 at 2961. Such a distinction "would not seem possible ...since all
taxpayers' actions involve an assertion of private rights in order to protect, as the plaintiff
sees them, public rights." Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, 69 YALr LJ.
895, 920 n.146 (1960). Brown should be considered overruled, sub silentio, by Colvin and
the later cases. Id.; 2 BAanoN & HoLTzorr § 569 (Supp. 1969 at 120 n.0); ci. jaffe, Standing
to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1265, 1281 n173 (1961).
Even those who think that Brown was correctly decided concede that the case is cited
in subsequent decisions only to distinguish it. Ilsen & Sardell, supra note 7, at 17 n,0e.
Whatever effect is given to Brown, the Flast situation would seem to be controlled by
Scott v. Frazier, 253 U.S. 243 (1920). See pp. 1585-87 inlra.
42. See Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note 41, at 920; Jaffe,
supra note 41, at 1281.
43. 253 U.S. 243 (1920).
44. LAws OF NORTH DAKOTA, ch. 147-48, 150-54 (1919). The legislation provided for
state participation in the businesses of manufacturing and marketing farm products and
of providing homes. The scheme provided for the appropriation of money and the crea-
tion of a state banking system, and authorized bond issues and taxes to finance the plan.
45. 253 U.S. at 244. There was no diversity of citizenship.
46. Id. The Court cited Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379 (1901), and Rogers v,
Hennepin County, 239 U.S. 621 (1916), in support of this statement.(The jurisdictional amount was first set at $500, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 § 11, 1
Stat. 78; increased to $2,000, Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552; increased to$3,000, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1091; and finally increased to $10,000,
Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415.)
47. 351 F.2d 323 (3d Cir. 1965).
48. Id. at 327-28.
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carefiflly reviewed the Supreme Court precedents.49 The Court held
that "the present action is controlled by Scott v. Frazier, thereby pre-
venting the aggregation of claims."50
The "plaintiff-viewpoint" reasoning behind the Scott-Fuller line of
cases focuses narrowly on the nature of the monetary claims of the
taxpayer-complainants. Plaintiffs in suits such as Scott (or Flast) are
complaining about the taking of their tax money to finance allegedly
unconstitutional government programs.5 ' Since each plaintiff's claim
is grounded in his individual tax liability, the aggregation decisions
hold, the members of the class do not possess "undivided" interests
in the suit. Rather, the interests are distinct and vary with the
size of each tax bill. The right asserted is the one not to be taxed
for unconstitutional programs; and, from the perspective of the plain-
tiff, the value of that right is only the amount of his disputed tax.
The aggregation decisions, in other words, distinguish between the
monetary interests of the plaintiffs and the constitutional principles
they seek to vindicate. 52 It does not matter whether a spending program
is attacked as violating First53 or Fourteenth 4 Amendment principles.
The claims are grounded in each plaintiff's tax bill, and thus are
"separate and distinct." The constitutional principle involved is com-
mon to all, but the rights by which the suit is brought are not..s
The Scott-Fuller line of decisions deals only with state taxpayer
suits. But the holdings are based on the nature of the rights asserted
49. Id. The Third Circuit saw Russell v. Stansell, 105 US. 303 (1881). Williams v.
Riley, 280 U.S. 78 (1929), Rogers v. Hennepin County, 239 U.S. 621 (1916), Wheless v.
St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379 (1901), Colvin v. City of Jacksonville, 158 US. 456 (1895), and
Scott v. Frazier, 9-53 U.S. 243 (1920), as embodying the proposition that taxpayer suits
involve separate, and hence nonaggregable claims.
The court noted the existence of Brown v. Trousdale, 138 U.S. 389 (1891), but rejected
it as not controlling. Seemingly, the Court accepted the position of the Yale Note, supra
note 41, and rejected Professor Moore's reading of Brown, 351 F.2d at 328 n.8.
50. 351 F.2d at 328.
51. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968).
The taxpayer's allegation in such cases would be that his tax money is being extracted
and spent in violation of those constitutional provisions which operate to constrict
the exercise of the taxing and spending power.
52. For a similar analysis see Note, 80 U. PA. L. REv. 106, 109 (1931):
[Tjaxpayer's suits have caused little difficulty. Here the distinction between a principle
common to all and a right common to all has been recognized. The citizen's consti-
tutional guaranty is, in these cases, a principle common to all. But the rights against
the person or persons violating this guaranty derive in no way from a common source.
They are inherently distinct to the individual.
53. As in Flast.
54. As in Scott or Fuller.
55. As one court put it,[T]he taxpayer's interest is quite different from the public interest all citizens have
in maintaining the integrity of the constitution. One is a property interest; the other
is intangible and personal in its nature, having to do with political rights.
State of Ohio ex rel. Erkenbrecher v. Cox, 257 F. 334, 339 (S.D. Ohio 1919).
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by taxpayer-plaintiffs, not on considerations of federalism. Thus, the
rule that taxpayers present separate and distinct claims should apply
to federal taxpayer suits, once standing is established.
There is nothing in the holding of Flast that avoids the effect of
the Scott-Fuller line. Indeed, the majority opinion is particularly sus-
ceptible to Scott-Fuller reasoning. Justice Harlan's dissent notwith-
standing, the majority in Flast does not simply grant standing for
"public actions."0 ,6 A litigant attempting to invoke federal jurisdiction
to challenge an expenditure must be more than a member of the pub-
lic at large-he must be a taxpayer.0 7 There is standing to sue only
when a plaintiff
[A]lleges that congressional action under the taxing and spend-
ing clause is in derogation of those constitutional provisions which
operate to restrict the exercise of the taxing and spending power.
The taxpayer's allegation in such cases would be that his tax
money is being spent in violation of specific constitutional protec-
tions against such abuses of legislative power18
In short, Flast requires that plaintiffs have a property interest at stake;
and one who has none-either because he is not a taxpayer or because
a challenged program will not increase federal expenditures-has no
standing to sue. 0
56. See Flast, 392 U.S. at 119-20 (dissenting opinion). The phrase, of course, is Professor
Jaffe's, and is used to describe a court challenge to governmental action where the plai,.
tiff need not allege that he is adversely affected by the program he seeks to have reviewed,
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADhINISTRATIVE ACTION 460 (1965).
57. See Protestants & Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State v.
Watson, 407 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1968), where the cause was remanded to the District
Court for a determination of whether the plaintiff organization was a taxpayer. If not,
standing was to be denied.
It has been argued that the distinction is illusory, and that taxpayer suits have "func.
tionally" become citizens' suits. Note, Taxpayers Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note
41, at 906. Compare Bittker, The Case of the Fictitious Taxpayer: The Federal Taxpayer's
Suit Twenty Years After Flast v. Cohen, 36 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 364 (1969), with Davis, The
Case of the Real Taxpayer: A Reply to Professor Bittker, 36 U. Cin. L. Rtv. 375 (1969),
While Professors Bittker and Davis disagree about the logic of limiting Flast's reach to
actual taxpayers, both seem to recognize that the decision itself imposes such a lhinit.
See also Davis, supra note 5, at 613.
58. 392 U.S. at 106.
59. See Essex County Welfare Bd. v. Cohen, 299 F. Supp. 176 (D. N.J. 1969), where
standing was denied to a member of a welfare board to challenge congressional enact-
ments curtailing aid to dependent children. The court held that:
Suing as a federal taxpayer, Lazaro cannot satisfy the nexus requirement without al-
leging an unconstitutional congressional expenditure. Instead he attacks a congres.
sional enactment that, when effective, would restrict and delimit federal expenditures.
Since he can claim no injury to his pocketbook by the statute, and there is no judtlcally
cognizable right of a federal taxpayer to force Congress to add to his tax burden and
undertake expenditures, Lazaro has no standing as a federal taxpayer .... The grounds
on which he attacks the statute do not relate to his status as a taxpayer.
299 F. Supp. at 179.
The same result was reached in Triplett v. Tiemann, 802 F. Supp. 1239 (D. Neb. 1969),
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In sum, under the "workable standards" developed by the Scott-
Fuller line of cases, federal taxpayer-plaintiffs present "separate and
distinct" claims which cannot be aggregated to meet amount in con-
troversy requirements. By preserving these standards, Snyder effectively
blocks Flast-type suits based on both federal question and diversity
jurisdiction. Since there are no other jurisdictional statutes under
which taxpayer suits can be brought,r0 Snyder has the effect of ren-
dering the seemingly monumental Flast decision an illusion-federal
taxpayers have standing to sue, but they cannot meet amount in con-
troversy requirements. 61
IV. The Inapplicability of the Snyder Rationale.
That Snyder appears, sub silentio, to have foreclosed federal tax-
payer suits is surprising. That result might be justified, however, if
the policies behind the Snyder decision demanded it. Yet, on analysis,
those reasons do not provide a satisfactory rationale for denying aggre-
gation in federal taxpayer suits.
In Snyder, Justice Black states two basic justifications for the
where taxpayers challenged a state effort to reduce aid to school districts that had received
federal assistance. See also Carlsbad Union School Dist. v. Rafferty, 00 F. Supp. 434 (S.D.
Cal. 1969).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1343, the general civil rights provision, has no amount in controversy
requirement; but it applies only where state action is involved. Wheeldin v. Wheeler,
373 U.S. 647, 650 (1963).
28 U.S.C. § 1346, which authorizes suits against the United States for amounts less than
$10,000, grants jurisdiction only in suits for monetary damages. Jurisdiction is not au-
thorized where declaratory or equitable relief is sought. Wells v. United States, 280 F.2d
275 (9th Cir. 1960).
There would appear to be no other original jurisdictional statutes applicable.
61. Two post-Snyder cases have denied aggregation in suits involving state or local
taxpayers. In Local 1497 Nat'l Fed'n of Fed. Employees v. City : County of Denver, 801
F. Supp. 1108 (D. Colo. 1969), the plaintiff federal employees sought relief against a local
occupational tax. Noting that the tax required of each employee was only $2 a month, the
Court dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction, refusing to aggregate the claims
of federal employees as a class.
In Booth v. Lemont Mfg. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. Ill. 1969), the plaintiff brought
a taxpayers' class action against a sanitary district and certain corporations to i'hich
it had leased land, contending that the leases were unconstitutional. Citing Snyder, Fuller,
and Scott, the court dismissed the case, noting that "taxpayers' claims relating to property
rights may not be aggregated." Id. at 237 (emphasis in original).
No court has yet denied aggregation in a federal taxpayers' suit. But, in Richardson v.
Sokol, 409 F.2d 3 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 596 U.S. 949 (1969), it was found that a taxpayer's
challenge to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 did not meet amount in con-
troversy requirements. The court based its ruling on the fact that no actual expenditures
were being challenged, but noted that
In point of fact even if the appropriations themselves were challenged, there is sub.
stantial doubt whether appellant could invoke the federal question jurisdiction of
the district court. 1 Moore's Federal Practice, Para. 0.91 [1], 2d ed. 194
409 F.2d at 5 n.3. In the relevant portion of his work, Professor Moore maintains that the
plaintiff-viewpoint test is proper in approaching amount in controversy problems.
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traditional aggregation rule. The first is the fear that allowing ag-
gregation in diversity cases could clutter up federal courts with minor
controversies involving questions of state law.12 That justification,
however, is clearly inapplicable to Flast-type suits. Even critics of the
Flast decision recognize that the issues raised by federal taxpayer suits
are national in scope.0 3 Indeed, by limiting standing to those who
challenge congressional spending on constitutional grounds, the Court
in Flast foreclosed suits presenting purely local issues.
Justice Black's second justification for the traditional aggregation
rule is that it helps maintain a reasonable workload in federal courts
by excluding trivial lawsuits. 4 Fear of a sharp increase in litigation
was, of course, a reason for the Court's rejection of federal taxpayer
suits in Frothingham v. Mellon.65 The Flast Court was well aware of
"the fear expressed in Frothingham that allowing one taxpayer to
sue would inundate the federal courts with countless similiar suits."00
The majority opinion meets such fears in two ways. First, the Court
states that the availability of joinder 67 and class actions 8 under the
Federal Rules mitigates the possibility of redundant suits."0 Second,
the restricted grant of standing in Flast implicitly limits taxpayers'
access to the federal courts. A taxpayer is not granted standing "to air
his generalized grievances about conduct of government or the alloca.
tion of power in the Federal system."70 The taxpayer plaintiff must
allege that substantial7l expenditures made under the taxing and
62. 394 U.S. at 340.
63. Justice Harlan, for example, argued that decisions about such matters were
constitutionally entrusted to Congress and the President, not to Article III courts. 392 U.S.
at 130-33 (dissenting opinion). See also Davis, Standing to Challenge Governmntal Action,
59 MINN. L. REv. 353, 391 (1955) ("those who support the Frothinghan doctrine assert
that Congress should be the sole judge of the manner in which taxpayers' money Is spent,')
64. 394 U.S. at 337.
65. 262 U.S. 447, 487 (1923):
If one taxpayer may champion and litigate such a cause, then every other taxpayer
may do the same, not only in respect of the statute here under review, but also In
respect of every other appropriation act whose administration requires the outlay of
public money, and whose validity may be questioned.
In the years between the Frothingharn and Flast decisions, the fear of opening the "flood.
gates of litigation" was seen as the principal argument for continuing to deny standing to
federal taxpayers. Davis, supra note 63, at 390-91.
66. 892 U.S. at 94.
67. Ftm. R. Crv. P. 18-21.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
69. 392 U.S. at 94. See also Judge Frankel's dissent below, where lie notes that federal
courts have learned in recent years to cope effectively with "huge litigations" and "re-
dundant actions." Flast v. Gardner, 271 F. Supp. 1, 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (dissenting opinion),
Cf. Davis, supra note 5, at 634.
70. 392 U.S. at 106.
71. Id. at 103.
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spending power of Congress72 violate a specific constitutional limita-
ton on that power.73
When read strictly, these requirements effectively prevent the over-
burdening of federal courts with taxpayer suits.7 4 Perhaps most im-
portant is the requirement that expenditures violate a "specific"
constitutional limitation on the taxing and spending power. In Flast,
the Court ruled that the Establishment Clause is such a limitation, 75
leaving open the question of whether others even existY. To date, no
court has discerned the requisite specificity in any provision other than
the Establishment Clause.77 Instead, the specificity requirement has
been employed to deny standing to taxpayers challenging expenditures
for the war in Vietnam,78 the Demonstration Cities program,70 and
OEO legal aid services8 0 Each suit was held to involve merely "gen-
eralized" allegations of unconstitutionality.
The requirements that expenditures be substantial and that they be
made pursuant to the taxing and spending power provide further safe-
guards against the undue proliferation of federal taxpayer suits. For
example, the District of Columbia Circuit has expressed doubt that
expenditures for a commemorative Christmas stamp are substantial
enough to warrant standing under Fast.81 And the Tenth Circuit has
held, in dismissing a taxpayer suit, that expenditures for the Vietnam
War are made pursuant to the powers "to raise and support Armies"
and "to provide and maintain a Navy" rather than the taxing and
spending power.8 2
Furthermore, to the extent that Flast will increase the workload of
72. Id. at 102.
73. Id. at 102-03.
74. It has been suggested that the Flast limitations are nonsensical and should be
loosened. Davis, supra note 5, at 608. If such a loosening were to occur, Flast would certainly
represent a greater burden on the federal workload than it now does. However, that event
would seem unlikely, since, of the Justices, only Justice Douglas seems to favor the
"public action" concept. 392 U.S. at 114 (concurring opinion). Moreover, any rclxation
of the Flast standards would necessarily entail a recognition by the Court of the probable
effect on federal judicial workloads.
75. 392 U.S. at 103-05.
76. Id. at 105.
77. See Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State
v. Watson, 407 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1968), in which the court apparently felt that Flast is
limited to situations in which a violation of the Establishment Clause is alleged.
78. Kalish v. United States, 411 F.2d 607 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 835, Teh.
denied, 396 U.S. 937 (1969); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), affg Velvel v.
Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
79. Benson v. City of Minneapolis, 286 F. Supp. 614, 619 (D. Minn. 1968).
80. Troutman v. Shriver, 417 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1969).
81. Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State v.
Watson, 407 F.2d 1264, 1265 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1968). The case was remanded for a determina-
tion of the "substantiality" of the expenditures.
82. Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 US. 1042 (1970).
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federal courts in spite of these restrictions, that result was foreseen
by the Court in its opinion. 3
There are additional reasons why the amount in controversy require-
ment should not be applied to Flast-type suits. Court-made rules con-
cerning aggregation should serve the general objectives behind the
amount in controversy requirement. In establishing $10,000 as the
jursidictional amount, Congress implicitly decided that suits involving
lesser sums were either unimportant or better left to the original juris-
diction of state courts.8 4 Yet, neither of those judgments is applicable
to federal taxpayer suits.
Federal courts are clearly the most appropriate forum for Flast-type
actions. Moreover, in such suits the dollar amount of an individual
plaintiff's claims is hardly a proper measure of the importance of the
issues involved. Taxpayers in Flast-type suits are, in Justice Douglas'
words, "private attorneys general."8 5 Even though standing in Flast is
based on "pocketbook interest," perhaps for historical reasons, the real
motivation of the individual plaintiffs is not their personal financial
stakes in the action.86 Rather, they are attempting to assert the public's
interest in keeping Congress within constitutional bounds.8T Since the
interest asserted is necessarily, under the limits of Flast, a matter of im-
portant public policy and is not personal in a narrow monetary sense,
it is inappropriate to measure "importance" solely in personal financial
terms. As long as substantial federal expenditures and serious constitu.
tional questions are involved, the public's interest is certainly i-a.
portant enough to justify federal jurisdiction.
Of course, state taxpayers challenging the constitutionality of state
laws may also be acting as "private attorneys general." But, even when
such suits involve important federal questions, the state courts are an
appropriate original forum. Leaving such suits to state courts avoids
state-federal friction s and allows state court judges to interpret state
statutes.8 9 The workload of the federal district courts is thus not in.
creased, while direct appeal and certiorari to the Supreme Court remain
available for the litigant raising federal questions. Consequently, al-
83. See p. 1588 supra.
84. See Hearings on H.R. 2516 and H.R. 4497, before Subcommittee No. 3 of the hotise
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957); H.R. REP. No. 1706, Bith Cong.,
2d Sess. (1958); S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
85. 392 U.S. at 108-09 (concurring opinion).
86. The costs of litigation outweigh the effect of the challenged program on any plain.
tiff's tax bill. See note 8 supra.
87. 392 U.S. at, 108 (concurring opinion).
88. See Note, Taxpayers' Suits: A Survey and Summary, supra note 41, at 921.
89. Cf. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
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though the traditional aggregation doctrine should be held inapplicable
in federal taxpayer suits, its continued application to state taxpayer
suits can be defended. 90
V. The Proper Aggregation Principle for Federal Taxpayer Suits.
Many commentators had hoped that the 1966 Amendment of Rule
23 would provide an opportunity to abandon the traditional aggre-
gation doctrine.91 Consequently, the Court's opinion in Snyder has
come under heavy attack. The decision is criticized for preserving in
the context of aggregation questions the same confusing standards that
the 1966 Amendment was intended to abolish for class actions.02 This
Note suggests further grounds for criticism of Snyder. In the Flast
situation, the traditional aggregation doctrine furthers neither the
policies articulated by Justice Black nor those voiced by Congress when
it established a jurisdictional amount. In addition, the role of plain-
tiffs as private attorneys general in federal taxpayer suits makes a focus
on the dollar amount of each individual's claim conceptually inap-
propriate.
Professor Wright has suggested that Snyder be circumvented by a
congressional amendment of the diversity jurisdiction statute defining
the amount in controversy as the aggregated claims of the class in Rule
23 actions.93 Whatever the merits of that proposal, it would not mitigate
the effect of Snyder on Flast.type actions, which are brought under
general federal question jurisdiction. In order to preserve the effect of
Flast, Congress should define the amount in controversy in federal tax-
payer suits as the aggregated claims of all plaintiffs.0 4
If such legislative action is not forthcoming, the courts should ex-
90. Although at some cost in consistency, considering the "private attorney general"
nature of the plaintiffs in both types of suits. See p. 1592 infra.
91. See Frankel, supra note 7; Bangs, supra note 7; Kaplan, supra note 34, at 399-400;
Note, 43 TULANE L R V. 360 (1969); Note, 52 MJIfNN. L. REv. 509, 514-15 (1967). But see
Note, Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 68 CoLuNs. L. REv. 1554 (1968).
92. See Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 182-84 (1969); Note, The Supreme Court,
196 Term, 83 HAnv. L. RnV. 7, 202-12 (1969); Note, Class Actions Under Amended Rule 23:
Three Years of Judicial Interpretation, 49 Bosr. UNIV. L. REv. 682, 715 (1969); Note, 21
Syn. L. REv. 326 (1969). But see Note, 22 UNiV. FLA. L. REV. 154 (1969).
93. Wright, supra note 92, at 184. See also, Note, The Supreme Court, 196S Term, 83
HARv. L. REV. 7, 212 (1969). cf. Currie, supra note 7, at 297-98, where it is suggested that
all amount in controversy requirements be abolished.
94. Much of the argument above would support entirely abolishing the amount in
controversy requirement in taxpayer suits. See generally, Currie, supra note 7, at
297-98. This proposal has not been emplored, however, because of the standing require-
ment of "substantial" expenditures in Flast. That requirement renders hypothetical any
discussion of setting the jurisdictional amount below a "substantial" sum.
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clude Flast-type suits from the effect of Snyder. Snyder might be over-
ruled and aggregation allowed in all class actions brought under Rule
23, but that seems unlikely. Or, the courts might repudiate Scott and
Fuller and hold that all taxpayer suits involve common and undivided
claims.95 Such a course, however, would extend the original jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts to state as well as federal taxpayer suits.
Congress might, of course, appropriately allow aggregation of claims
in state taxpayer suits brought in federal courts. But since the tradi-
tional aggregation doctrine, as applied to state taxpayer suits, is con-
sistent with the objectives of the jurisdictional amount requirement,
and since there would be some effect on the federal workload, such a
judgment is better left to Congress than the courts.
The simplest solution would be for the courts to adopt a modified
"defendant-viewpoint"0 0 and to hold, as a matter of policy, that fed-
eral 97 taxpayer suits meet amount in controversy requirements when-
ever a spending program involving more than $10,000 is challenged 8
This approach would involve a departure from the "workable stan-
dards" of the past. But, at least as applied to federal taxpayer suits, those
standards are inappropriate and clearly antagonistic to the spirit of
Flast v. Cohen.
95. There is some authority for such a course in the analogous area of derivative suits
by stockholders, which are treated as true class suits. See 8B Moore 23.1.21 and cases
cited therein. The taxpayer has been likened to a stockholder, suing to prevent "ultra
vires" acts by the government. See Doremus v. Bd. of Ed., 842 U.S. 429, 436 (192) (Douglas,
J., dissenting opinion). Cf. 2 BA.RtoN & HOLTZOFF § 569 n.38 (Supp. 1969). See also Brown
v. Trousdale, 138 U.S. 389 (1891).
96. See p. 1578 supra. This solution, unlike one based on the plaintlff.vicwpolnt,
avoids artificial manipulation of the "joint and common" and "separate and distinct"
classifications. Under the plaintiff-viewpoint, federal and state taxpayer suits could be
distinguished only by arbitrarily labeling the claims "joint and common" in the forier
and "separate and distinct" in the latter.
97. This approach could rationally distinguish state taxpayer suits, because of tile
appropriateness of the state courts. See pp. 1590-91 supra.
98. This, of course, implies no opinion about how "substantial" expenditures must be
to satisfy the standing requirement. See p. 1589 supra.
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